The 'daylight saving effect' predicts that the mean weekend return following the spring and fall/autumn changes in daylight saving time is less than the mean weekend return throughout the rest of the year. With this market anomaly, the change in market participants' behaviour is linked with sleep desynchronosis and the change in circadian rhythm and its negative impact on sleep patterns. This study investigates the purported daylight saving effect in Australian equity market returns over the period 1979/80-2002/03 using parametric testing and regression analysis. After adjustments are made for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the data, neither the transition to nor the movement from daylight saving is associated with returns that differ from other days. The results also show the absence of any significant weekend effect in the Australian equity market.
Introduction
In a recent provocative article, Kamstra et al. (2000) found that the average Friday-to-Monday stock return on daylight saving weekends was 200 to 500 percent larger than the average negative return for other weekends (the so-called 'weekend-effect' market anomaly) and thereby associated with a one-day loss of US$31 billion on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ markets alone. Kamstra's et al. (2000) findings appeared to hold not only in the United States and Canada, where the transition to and from daylight saving is broadly similar, but also in the United Kingdom, whose patterns differ from that in North America, and to a lesser extent in Germany. On this basis, Kamstra et al. (2000 Kamstra et al. ( : 1010 suggested that if daylight saving was associated with "…the sort of impact investigated here, an obvious policy implication is to do away with the time change altogether".
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The essence of Kamstra's et al (2000) argument is that the 'daylight saving effect' is linked with sleep desynchronosis associated with the change in the circadian rhythm and its (negative) impact on sleep patterns. Every Spring at 2:00 a.m. on the first Sunday in April US clocks are moved forward one hour, and the following Fall (Autumn) at 2:00 a.m. on the last Sunday in October clocks are moved back one hour. As with jet lag, where changes in sleep patterns are thought to persist up to five days for each one-hour time zone crossed (Waterhouse et al. 1997) , the movement to daylight saving time also compresses the day, while the movement from daylight saving stretches it, and this also impacts upon sleep patterns. If, and as hypothesised by Kamstra et al. (2000 Kamstra et al. ( : 1006 , "…sleep desynchronosis causes market participants to suffer greater anxiety about a given situation, ceteris paribus, they may prefer safer investments and shun risk in trades during the trading day following such a disturbance in their sleep patterns…this could push down stock prices following daylight saving shifts when the desynchronosis is systematic".
Of course, the argument that shifts to and from daylight saving has an impact upon actual behaviour has parallels elsewhere. One possibility is that the change in photoperiod induced by daylight saving time may also have an effect on psychiatric presentation. The argument is that sleep deprivation, and the manipulation of circadian rhythm associated with the transition to daylight saving, alter the clinical state of depressed patients. Moreover, the successful use of 'light therapy' for treating seasonal affective disorder gives credence to the possibility that even a small shift in circadian rhythm has an influence on affective illness. Bick and Hannah (1986) , for example, linked a 81 percent increase in depressed contacts and a 47 percent increase in psychosis-related presentations at a UK crisis intervention centre with the shift to daylight saving. However, in another UK study, Shapiro et al. (1990) examined the incidence of parasuicide presentations, psychiatric outpatient contacts and inpatient admission, and registered suicides following the start of daylight saving, but found no discernible impact through either the change in photoperiod or the small impact on the circadian rhythm.
A further possibility is the impact of daylight saving transition on traffic accidents through sleep desynchronosis and the change in circadian rhythm. Sullivan and Flannagan (2002) , for example, found that pedestrians were three to nearly seven times more likely to be injured following transitions to and from daylight saving. Varughese and Allen (2001) also linked a small increase in fatal accidents with the Monday following the changeover in the US, while in a Canadian study, Coren (1996a Coren ( , 1996b ) measured a significant increase (up to some eight percent) in accident risk on the Monday following the spring change to daylight saving and a comparable decrease in the fall change from daylight saving. By way of contrast, Lambe and Cummings (2000) found that the sleep deprivation normally associated with the change over to daylight saving had no measurable impact on crash incidence in Sweden.
All the same, there are a number of complications associated with Kamstra's et al. (2000) purported daylight saving effect, which may not arise in non-financial market contexts. To start with, the daylight saving effects exists in parallel with the oft-examined weekend effect, for which a number of competing hypotheses have already been put forward and tested [see, for instance, Agrawal and Ikenberry (1994) , Chang et al. (1993 Chang et al. ( , 1998 and Wang and Erickson (1997) ]. For example, the weekend effect has been linked to lags in the payment and cheque clearing settlements, to midweek time pressures on individuals, the tendency for financial advice to be given after Monday strategy-setting meetings, and to the larger percentage of purchases (sales) on Fridays (Mondays) at dealer ask (bid) prices (Kamstra et al. 2000) . It may then be possible that the sleep desynchronosis associated with daylight saving weekends is just an alternative manifestation of this more usual market anomaly. For example, Pinegar (2002 Pinegar ( : 1256 countered that "the change in sleeping patterns from weekdays to weekends occurs with much greater frequency and is very plausibly more pronounced than the change in sleeping patterns between daylight-saving and non-daylight saving weekend.
Thus sleep desynchronosis may contribute to the so-called 'day-of-the-week' effect on nondaylight saving Mondays also".
Another problem is that daylight saving transition weekends are by nature limited in number, and these may be juxtaposed with outliers. Once again, Pinegar (2002) questioned Kamstra's et al (2000) conclusions on the basis that in the last eighty years three of the largest percentage declines in the S&P 500 took place after a fall daylight-saving time change (most recently Monday 26 October 1987). In response, Kamstra et al. (2002) countered, "…while we do not believe that daylight-saving-time changes cause market crashes, we do believe that daylight-saving-time changes affect the degree of market fluctuations…we speculate that severe downturns are more likely following daylight-saving weekends, and we argue that the data support this contention" (original emphasis). Lastly, Pinegar (2000) also argues that the apparent corroboration offered by Kamstra's et al. (2000) inclusion of Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom in their analysis may be an illusion associated with the normal influence on them by the US market, and that such international evidence should then be treated more cautiously.
The purpose of the present paper is to add to this small but intriguing body of work the results of an analysis of the Australian equity market. To the author's knowledge this is the first of its kind in Australia, and adds significantly to the nascent literature concerning the economic benefits and costs of daylight saving. The paper itself is divided into four main areas. The first section reviews the concept of daylight saving. The second section explains the empirical methodology and data collection employed in the analysis. The third section discusses the results. The paper ends with some brief concluding remarks.
Daylight saving
For millennia, the measurement of time has been based on the position of the sun, with noon being denoted when it is highest in the sky. Even with mechanical clocks replacing sundials in the Middle Ages, the measurement of local (or true or apparent) solar time has been bound with observation of the sun at noon (or its indirect calculation by means of astronomical tables) and time accordingly varied continuously with longitude. Well into the nineteenth century time was a genuinely local matter, and most cities and towns used some form of solar time, usually reflected in a well-observed standard such as a church or town hall clock. An accidental sudden noise waked me about six in the morning, when I was surprised to find my room filled with light…I got up and looked out to see what might be the occasion of it, when I saw the sun just rising above the horizon, from whence he poured his rays plentifully into my chamber, my domestic having negligently omitted, the previous evening, to close the shutters…if I had not been awakened so early in the morning, I should have slept six hours longer by the light of the sun, and in exchange have lived six hours the following night by candlelight; the latter being a much more expensive light than the former…I believe all who have common sense, as soon as they have learnt from this paper that it is daylight when the sun rises, will contrive to rise with him. [S]tandard time remains so fixed, that for nearly half the year the sun shines upon the land for several hours each day while we are asleep, and is rapidly nearing the horizon, having already passed its western limit, when we reach home after the work of the day is over. Under the most favourable circumstances, there then remains only a brief spell of declining daylight in which to spend the short period of leisure at our disposal. Now, if some of the hours of wasted sunlight could be withdrawn from the beginning and added to the end of the day, how many advantages would be gained by all, and in particular by those in the open air, when light permits them to do so, whatever time they have at their command after the duties of the day have been discharged. 
Research method and data
Two dates are relevant for countries in the northern hemisphere implementing summer time DST: (i) a Sunday a.m. starting time and date, usually in early April, and (ii) a Sunday a.m. ending time and date, normally in late October in the same year. In the southern hemisphere, as in Australia, the starting and ending months are reversed and in succeeding years.
However, one complication that does exist in Australia is that not all states and territories currently use DST, and of those that do the timing and adherence to the usual starting and ending dates has varied over the last several decades. As shown in Table 1 The DST starting and ending weekends are further categorised according to the different sets of starting and ending dates discussed above.
The basic hypothesis examined in this analysis is that the change to DST impacts upon sleep patterns in such a way that the daily returns for the next trading day following such a transition will differ from other days. Further, since the transition to (and from) DST has the effect of stretching (compressing) the day, and thereby having a negative (positive) effect on sleep patterns, the returns for the next trading day will be less (more) than other day returns.
Finally, since the 'daylight saving effect' exists in parallel to the usual 'weekend effect' the magnitude of the change will be larger (smaller) than the expected (negative) weekend effect.
Two approaches are used to test these hypotheses. The first involves a descriptive analysis of the mean returns and tests of equality of these means using parametric analysis following Kamstra et al. (2000) . As a rule, the mean return for the start of daylight saving is expected to be negative and less than the (negative) return for other weekends, while the mean return for the end of daylight saving can be either negative or positive, though the mean return should be higher than that for daylight saving or other weekends. The second is a regression-based approach where daily market returns are regressed against variables indicating the presence of daylight saving and weekend effects:
where RTN t is the daily Monday to Friday market return at time t, STT is a dummy variable that equals one on a Monday following a weekend when DST started, END a dummy variable that equals one on a Monday following a weekend when DST ended, WKD a dummy variable that equals one for all other Mondays, β are coefficients to be estimated and ε is the error term. This approach follows that used Pinegar (2002) . Following the hypotheses presented, the signs on the coefficients for WKD and STT are both expected to be negative, though the magnitude of STT is hypothesised to be larger than WKD, while the hypothesised sign on the coefficient for END is positive. Table 2 presents the summary of descriptive statistics for daily market returns. These are categorised according to the daylight saving and weekend effects hypothesised: namely, (i) non-DST starting or ending weekends, (ii) DST starting weekends common to NSW and VIC, (iii) DST ending weekends common to NSW and VIC, (iv) DST ending weekends for NSW but not VIC, (v) DST ending weekends for VIC but not NSW, (vi) DST starting weekends for other states and territories that were not shared by NSW and/or VIC, (vii) DST ending weekends for other states and territories that that were not shared by NSW and/or VIC, and (viii) all other days. Price returns are depicted in the upper portion of Table 1, However, the t-tests comparing these mean returns to other days and weekends indicate that few of these differences are statistically significant. The starting DST mean price return is significantly less than other days at the .10 level suggesting that the mean return for Mondays following the introduction of DST in NSW and VIC is six times less than other days, while the return for other states starting DST is about thirteen times less. But these mean differences are no longer significant when specified in terms of returns on the accumulation index. In that instance, only the mean return for other states starting and ending DST are significant (at the .10 and .05 levels, respectively) suggesting mean accumulation returns are between six and nine times less for Mondays following the starting and ending of DST in states other than NSW and VIC where such dates differ.
Empirical findings
Significance tests for the differences of means as compared to weekend returns offer a similar picture. For the price index, only the mean returns for other states ending DST is significant at a conventional level but does not conform to the hypothesised direction, whereas in the accumulation index the start and end of DST in states and dates other than NSW and VIC are also significant at the .10 level. In sum, the tests of differences in means show that price returns for Mondays following the introduction of DST are less than the returns for others days but only where DST has started on the same day in both NSW and VIC or where another state or territory has introduced DST on a day that differs from NSW and VIC. For accumulation returns, the mean return is less for Mondays following both the start or ending of DST in a state other than NSW and VIC. Lastly, the mean return for DST starting weekends in accumulation terms and DST ending weekends in price and accumulation returns is significantly less than other weekend returns, but only for DST starting and ending dates outside of NSW and/or VIC.
The estimated coefficients and standard errors of the parameters detailed in (1) are presented in Table 3 . The upper portion of Table 3 is where the dependent variable is specified as daily Monday to Friday price returns, while the lower portion details the results of regressions where daily accumulation returns comprise the dependent variable. The independent variables in all instances are dummy variables for DST starting (STT) and ending (END) and other weekends (WKD). However, in the first regression for price and accumulation returns, the dummy variables are identified for all DST starting and ending dates, while in the second regression in each case these are DST starting and ending dates in NSW and/or VIC only. Table   3 for each of the four regression models. These are standard errors, t-statistics and p-values obtained by: (i) ordinary least squares (Least Squares), (ii) those employing corrections for heteroskedasticity of unknown form (White) , and (iii) those incorporating corrections for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form (Newey-West).
Three different standard errors, t-statistics and p-values are calculated and presented in
Once again, the signs on the estimated coefficients appear to offer prima facie support for the posited daylight saving effect. The signs on WKD and STT are always negative, with the magnitude of STT being larger, suggesting the presence simultaneously of both the weekend and daylight saving effect market anomalies. That is, the weekend effect is associated with a lower mean return than others days and the start of DST is linked with a larger negative effect as compared to other weekends. The sign on END is likewise consistence with the hypothesis that mean returns following the end of DST are positive, or at least higher, than the mean returns of DST starting and non-starting weekends. However, only in the case of DST starting weekends are the least squares estimates of market returns significant. After corrections are made for heteroskedasticity (White) and heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West) none of the parameters are significant at any conventional level, irrespective of whether market returns are specified in price or accumulation terms, or whether the transition weekends are in all Australian states and territories or only NSW and VIC. On average, weekend returns that follow the start or end of daylight saving time are not abnormally high or low when compared to other weekends or other days of the week. Furthermore, there is no significant difference between weekend returns as defined (Friday-Monday) and daily returns Monday-Tuesday, Tuesday-Wednesday, Wednesday-Thursday and Friday-Thursday.
Concluding remarks and policy recommendations
The present study employs parametric analysis to test for the 'daylight saving effect' market anomaly in the Australian stock market. At first there would appear to be a small of amount of empirical evidence to support the conjecture that the transition to (and from) daylight saving, as variously defined, is associated with a lower (higher) mean market return than either other weekends or other days. However, after adjustments are made for heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation, neither the transition to daylight saving nor the movement from daylight saving is associated with returns that are statistically significant from other days, let alone other weekends. These results lie counter to the US, UK and Canadian findings of Kamstra et al. (2000 Kamstra et al. ( , 2002 but are similar to the results of Pinegar (2002 Pinegar ( : 1255 who also found that the hypothesis that "…mean weekend returns are significantly lower following changes in daylight-saving vis-à-vis other weekends is not robust". Indeed, there would also appear to be no evidence in this study to support even the well-investigated hypotheses underlying the weekend effect market anomaly. Daylight saving in Australia may be opposed on a number of policy grounds, but it would appear that adverse affects on capital markets should not be one of them.
Of course, the sleep desynchronosis linked with the transition to and from daylight saving may have a role to play in financial markets that has not been investigated here. All of these indicate future directions for research. One possibility follows the suggestion of Pinegar (2002) that changes in sleep patterns may amplify the impact of negative news and that the true impact of daylight saving, or indeed any other source of sleep disturbance, may be measured by how daylight saving transition weekends affect the magnitude of positive and/or negative changes, rather than positive and/or negative changes themselves. Another possibility is that the adjustment process to daylight saving may be slower than that hypothesised, and that the full effect of sleep desynchronosis may be felt at less significance over several days rather than the twenty-four hours employed here. Lambe and Cummings (2000) , for example, point out that the adjustment process in daylight saving may be longer than jet lag because of the absence of new external reference points to the change in time.
Finally, it may well be the case that the daylight saving effect, like many other market anomalies, is felt more keenly in small companies than large. Since this study uses marketweighted stock indices as against price or equal-weighted market indices or small cap sector indices, such differences may well be obscured. Newey and West (1987) .
